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Battle of Santa Cruz Islands

“STRIKE - REPEAT - STRIKE” Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, October 26, 1942

Chronology

  • August 31, 1942 — Saratoga torpedoed by Japanese submarine I-26; out of action for three months
  • September 10, 1942 — Enterprise enters Pearl Harbor for repairs and AA gun upgrades
  • September 12–14, 1942 — Battle of Bloody Ridge; Marines repel Japanese assault on Henderson Field
  • September 15, 1942 — Wasp sunk and North Carolina damaged by Japanese submarines; Hornet is the only operating American carrier
  • October 11–12, 1942 — Rear Admiral Scott’s force defeats Japanese cruiser and destroyer force off Cape Esperance
  • October 14–15, 1942 — Japanese battleships and cruisers bombard Henderson Field; over half of the 90 planes there destroyed
  • October 15, 1942 — Admiral Nimitz relieves Vice Admiral Ghormley; Vice Admiral Halsey named Commander South Pacific Force
  • October 18, 1942 — Enterprise departs Pearl Harbor with South Dakota, racing southwest for the Solomons
  • October 23, 1942 — Enterprise and Hornet rendezvous east of Espiritu Santo, forming Task Force 61 under Rear Admiral Kinkaid
  • October 25, 1942 — PBYs report Japanese carrier force; Enterprise launches scouts and strike; Kinkaid and Combined Fleet close on each other
  • October 26, 1942 — Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands; Hornet sunk; Enterprise the last American carrier in the Pacific
  • October 27, 1942 — Japanese ordered back to Truk; Enterprise buries 44 men killed at Santa Cruz at sea
  • November 11, 1942 — Enterprise sorties from Noumea with a full air group, the only operational carrier in the area

With the damage from the Eastern Solomons fight all too evident above and below deck, Enterprise unloaded munitions and fuel at Tongatabu, had the holes in her hull patched up, and set course for Pearl Harbor for proper repair. The cruiser Portland and four destroyers accompanied her, but her air group did not. With Japanese pressure on Guadalcanal and Port Moresby, New Guinea, growing by the day, the U.S. was desperate for air power in the South Pacific. Six fighters, six bombers, and their crews stayed with Enterprise for her protection. The rest were flown off to Wasp and Hornet, airfields in the New Hebrides, and Henderson Field on Guadalcanal.

The Big E entered Pearl Harbor on September 10, where repair crews immediately set to work on her, 24 hours a day. Not content to merely repair her wounds, the crews also replaced her old 1.1” anti-aircraft guns with 40mm Bofors quad (4 barrel) mounts. The Bofors delivered what the 1.1” could not: the power to knock a dive bomber or torpedo plane from the sky long before it had a chance to drop its ordnance. For good measure, a dozen more 20mm guns were installed as well.

26 October 1942: Three near misses straddle Enterprise, as she and her escorts turn in wild evasive maneuvers.

In Enterprise’s absence, the situation the Solomons steadily worsened. On August 31, while Enterprise was still in Tongatabu, Saratoga was torpedoed by Japanese submarine I-26, southeast of Guadalcanal. While the damage was slight, it was enough to force her out of action for three months, while her fragile electrical drive system was repaired for the second time that year.

Hornet and the smaller carrier Wasp now formed the core of American naval power in the Solomons. But on September 15, two short weeks after Saratoga’s departure, two Japanese subs ambushed the task force as it provided air cover for a transport convoy bound for Guadalcanal. Wasp caught three torpedoes at the worst possible time: just after she’d launched a patrol and her aviation fuel lines were full of gasoline. Within minutes, she was engulfed in fire and explosions; the order to abandon ship came less than an hour after the torpedoes struck.

About half an hour later, a second sub fired a spread of torpedoes at Hornet, five miles from where Wasp burned fiercely. By maneuver and luck, Hornet avoided being struck; however, one torpedo passed below her hull and struck the battleship North Carolina 500 yards away. Despite a 32 foot hole below the waterline, North Carolina maintained 25 knots and her position in formation. Minutes later, the destroyer O’Brien dodged one torpedo only to be struck by another, which practically tore her bow off. In less than an hour, two subs had destroyed a carrier, killed or wounded nearly 600 men, and forced North Carolina and O’Brien back to the West Coast for repair (O’Brien broke apart and sank during her return). Hornet was now the only operating American carrier in the Pacific.

The “Tokyo Express” from Rabaul continued landing Japanese soldiers and supplies on Guadalcanal most every night. By mid-September, the Japanese were strong enough to make another attempt to capture the Marine’s Henderson Field. On September 12, General Kawaguchi Kiyotake led his men against Marine positions on a low grassy ridge south of Henderson Field, soon known as “Bloody Ridge”. For two days and nights, the Japanese repeatedly assaulted the Marine line, at one point pressing it back to within 1500 yards of the precious airfield. But the Marines held, losing 40 of their own men for 600 Japanese, and by dawn September 14, the Japanese were in retreat.

By this time, a fundamental shift in Japanese strategy had taken place. Rejecting traditional principles of war, the Japanese believed the key to success on Guadalcanal was to wrest Henderson Field from the Marines, immediately begin operating from it using planes flown in from Rabaul and the carriers, and then sweep the seas clear of the American fleet. As long as the Americans could operate the airfield, they reasoned, they wouldn’t be able to build up sufficient force to remove the Americans from the area altogether.

American morale poster, from late 1942 or early 1943.

The fighting around Guadalcanal steadily intensified. Nearly every night, more Japanese soldiers were landed on the island, and the daily air raids and nighttime bombardments from Rabaul-based planes and ships continued. The attacks were not made with impunity: between October 16-25 alone, Marine and Navy pilots downed 103 enemy planes and sank a cruiser, losing only 14 planes of their own. An encouraging event took place the night of October 11-12, when Rear Admiral Norman Scott, having drilled his force in night combat techniques for weeks, blasted a Japanese cruiser and destroyer force off Cape Esperance, west of Savo Island.

Earlier October 11, the Japanese Combined Fleet had sailed from Truk, to prowl north of the Solomons, ready to take control the seas around Guadalcanal the moment the Army announced occupation of Henderson Field. Though reinforced by the 164th Regiment of the Americal Division (U.S. Army), and a bomber squadron led by Enterprise’s own LCDR Ray Davis, the U.S. positions on Guadalcanal came under severe shelling from Japanese battleships and cruisers the nights of October 14 and 15. Over half of the 90 planes at Henderson field were destroyed, and the aviation fuel was practically gone. Japanese control of the area was so complete that on the 15th they were able to land nearly 4500 troops in broad daylight.

In desperation, transport planes were called on to ferry fuel from Espiritu Santo to Guadalcanal, each flight carrying just enough aviation fuel to keep a dozen fighters aloft for an hour. Amazingly, by the afternoon, the Marine and Navy pilots were able to strike back at the Japanese, downing 17 enemy planes, and sinking three of the six transports which had landed troops that morning. That night however, the airfield again came under severe attack, as cruisers Myoko and Maya threw more than 1500 8” shells at the Marines.

In a bleak assessment of the situation, on October 15 Admiral Nimitz wrote:

“It now appears that we are unable to control the sea in the Guadalcanal area. Thus our supply of the positions will only be done at great expense to us. The situation is not hopeless, but it is certainly critical.”

That same day, Nimitz reached a decision. Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, Commander South Pacific Force, and his staff - competent, dedicated, but exhausted by the nearly impossible job before them - must be relieved. In Ghormley’s place, Nimitz choose a man known throughout the Pacific for his fighting spirit: Vice Admiral William F. Halsey. Though Halsey departed Pearl Harbor on the 14th for Noumea, he didn’t know until he stepped off the plane there what his orders were. Ghormley, while understandably disappointed to be relieved, greeted Halsey graciously, later conceding to Nimitz that he (Ghormley) was not the best man for the job at hand.

Halsey’s arrival in Noumea sent American morale skyrocketing throughout the region, as did his assurances to General Alexander A. Vandegrift, the Marine commander on Guadalcanal, that the Navy would give the Marines all possible support within its means. Halsey kept his word.

Two days after Halsey’s departure from Oahu, Enterprise cast away her lines, joined the fast, new battlewagon South Dakota BB-57, and raced southwest for the Solomons. All signs pointed to another major Japanese offensive. Sure enough, on October 20 the western perimeter of the American position on Guadalcanal came under assault. In Truk, Fleet Admiral Yamamoto was growing impatient with the Army commanders. For a week and a half, his ships had been sailing back and forth north of the Solomons, wasting precious fuel, waiting for the Army to capture Henderson Field. Take the airfield now, or the Combined Fleet will not have the fuel to support you, Yamamoto bluntly told General Hyakutake.

On October 23, as the Marines and Americal soldiers repelled a second violent Japanese assault, the Big E and her task force rendezvoused with Hornet east of Espiritu Santo, forming Task Force 61, under Rear Admiral Thomas Kinkaid. Halsey, anticipating a Japanese move into the waters northeast of Guadalcanal, ordered Kinkaid to sweep north of the Santa Cruz islands - a small, malaria-infested chain 700 miles north of New Caledonia - to engage the Japanese fleet.

The next night, in heavy rain, the Marines and the Americal regiment fought off still another Japanese assault. In the confusion of battle, a Japanese lookout mistakenly reported green-white-green flares, signaling that the Japanese had captured the airfield. Hyakutake, mindful of Yamamoto’s impatience, immediately radioed Rabaul, which in turn notified Yamamoto that the Army had at long last taken the airfield. Within hours, the Army began backing off the early, optimistic report, but not before Yamamoto had ordered the Combined Fleet, under Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo, to sail southeast and “annihilate” any and all American naval forces it found.

Dawn on October 25, then, found the Combined Fleet and Task Force 61 steaming aggressively towards each other, closing range at close to 30 miles every hour. Confrontation was inevitable.

A complex and bitterly fought engagement, Santa Cruz bore some similarities to the Battle of Midway, fought nearly five months earlier. In fact, Vice Admiral Halsey, still disappointed at missing Midway (he was recovering from a severe skin rash at the time), sought a similar opportunity at Santa Cruz, and might well have succeeded were it not for an unfortunate communications snafu.

“PROCEED WITHOUT HORNET”: Enterprise’s 0900 strike is told not to join up with Hornet’s planes. In another two hours, this message (on the signboard held by man in center) would acquire greater meaning.

Anticipating the Combined Fleet would make a move towards Guadalcanal, Halsey ordered Kinkaid’s Task Force 61 - consisting of Enterprise’s TF 16 and Hornet’s TF 17 - on an aggressive sweep northwest of the Santa Cruz Islands, hoping to outflank the Japanese fleet as it steamed southwards from Truk.

The first sign that Halsey’s prediction might bear out came shortly after noon, on October 25. Flying from Espiritu Santo, Vice Admiral Aubrey Fitch’s PBYs reported a Japanese carrier force steaming southeast at 25 knots, 360 miles northwest of Kinkaid’s TF 61. After closing range for two-and-a-half hours, Kinkaid seized the initiative and launched a dozen Enterprise Dauntlesses, to search on 200 mile legs, west to north. An hour later, at 1530, Enterprise launched a strike - 12 Dauntlesses and 6 Avengers, covered by 11 Wildcat fighters - though the exact position of the Japanese carriers was not known.

In fact, Japanese Admiral Nagumo, spooked by the snooping PBY, had turned his forces north, evading Enterprise’s strike altogether. By the time the planes returned to the task force it was dark, and the still-inexperienced pilots of Air Group 10 were forced to make night-landings. The first plane crashed on Enterprise’s deck. Most of the remaining planes made it aboard safely, but three Dauntlesses and three Avengers ditched, costing the life of LT Frank Miller.

Steaming northwest into the night at 20 knots, Kinkaid and his men settled in to wait for further contact reports from Fitch’s PBYs. Hornet’s men, eager to make up for disappointing results at Midway, spotted a full strike on her deck, should a moonlit attack be ordered.

Eleven minutes after midnight, the PBYs found Nagumo’s carriers again, 300 miles from Kinkaid and TF 61. Three hours later, PBYs found the carrier Zuikaku and her escorts, alarming the Japanese by launching torpedoes at the carrier and a destroyer. Nagumo, perhaps suspecting a trap, again ordered his fleet north, away from the probing enemy planes.

In Noumea, Halsey suffered no such timidity. The latest PBY reports put the Nagumo’s carriers within range of Hornet and Enterprise’s planes, the Japanese flank exposed to the prowling American carriers, just as it was at Midway. Here was a chance to deliver a smashing blow against the Combined Fleet. With three terse words, Halsey ordered TF 61 to deliver it: “STRIKE-REPEAT-STRIKE”.

Kinkaid’s reaction to Halsey’s electrifying signal was not recorded, but it’s fair to say that had Kinkaid known the position of the enemy carriers, he would scarcely have needed Halsey’s prodding to go into action. But Kinkaid did not know. The PBYs reported directly to their base on Espiritu Santo - not to the carriers - and by the time their contact reports were relayed to TF 61, Kinkaid had already launched patrols of his own.

Enterprise and TF 61 went to general quarters at 0550 on October 26. Fifteen minutes later, just before sunrise, Enterprise launched 16 Dauntless scouts, 500 lb bombs slung under their bellies, to patrol in pairs on 200 mile legs from the southwest to due north. A few minutes after the last SBD cleared the Big E’s deck, the sun rose to reveal a gorgeous tropical day: long gentle swells, breeze from the southeast at 6 to 10 knots, puffy cumulus clouds and occasional rain squalls. With the exception of the squalls, however, the weather favored the enemy: the scattered clouds offered shelter for approaching bombers, while the light wind would force Enterprise and Hornet to turn away from the Japanese to launch or land their planes.

Eighty-five miles out from the Big E, two of her SBDs spotted a Japanese “Kate” hurrying in the opposite direction. Intent on finding each other’s fleets, the planes passed without incident. Not long after, the Enterprise pilots - LT Vivian W. Welch and LT(jg) Bruce A. McGraw - sighted and reported two enemy battleships, accompanied by a cruiser and several destroyers, later determined to be Rear Admiral Hiroake Abe’s Vanguard force. Welch and McGraw continued their patrol, but made no further contacts.

Kinkaid’s target, the Japanese carriers, were further north. Twenty minutes after Welch reported the battleships and their escorts, Scouting Ten commander James R. Lee and his wingman ENS William E. Johnson found two big Japanese carriers - Shokaku and Zuikaku - 200 miles northwest of the American force. Though Lee and Johnson didn’t see it, a third carrier - Zuiho - was part of the same force. Mindful of Air Officer John Crommelin’s exhortation the night before - to let no opportunity go to waste - Lee and Johnson reported the carriers’ position, and then maneuvered into attack position. Nagumo’s Combat Air Patrol pilots were wide awake, however, and before the Dauntlesses could strike, they were intercepted by eight Zeros. Smart flying and sharp shooting downed three of the Zeros, and the doughty Dauntlesses escaped with only a roughing up.

Scouting Tens’ instructions directed the pilots to converge on the Japanese carriers once sighted. Hearing Lee’s report, LT Stockton Strong and his wingman ENS Charles Irvine cut short their search leg, and set course for Lee’s reported position. Shortly after 0830, Strong and Irvine arrived 14,000 feet above the Japanese, perfectly positioned between the bright sun and Zuiho’s vulnerable flight deck. The sun to their backs, and the Zeros drawn away by other Scouting Ten planes, the two Enterprise Dauntlesses plunged unopposed on Zuiho, releasing their 500 lb bombs 1,500 feet over her deck. Both bombs hit, blasting a 50-foot hole in Zuiho’s aft flight deck.

It would be months before Zuiho could conduct air operations again, but this morning she had already launched her planes, now well on their way to the American carriers. While Lee and Johnson were evading the Japanese CAP, a Shokaku plane had located and reported the presence of one American carrier. A little earlier, at 0740, another Japanese scout had come across Hornet (misidentified as Saratoga) 185 miles from the Nagumo’s force. Any advantages the early morning PBY contacts might have afforded Halsey and Kinkaid were rapidly eroded as the Japanese launched a 65-plane strike at 0818, targeting the American carrier now known to be nearby.

The fast battleship South Dakota at Santa Cruz. Note the elevation of the starboard gun batteries.

The first full American strike was launched at 0840, when Hornet launched 29 planes commanded by LT William “Gus” Widhelm. At the same time, Strong and Irvine were engaged in a running fight with angry Zeros after their successful dive-bombing attack. Gunners C. H. Garlow and E. P. Williams each downed a Zero. Remarkably, all 16 Scouting Ten planes returned to Enterprise, despite numerous encounters with Japanese CAP, and after scoring hits on a carrier and a destroyer.

At 0900, Enterprise launched all her remaining planes: eight Wildcats, nine Avengers and three SBDs. This strike and Widhelm’s did not join up, and by 0915 there were three American strikes in the air, as Hornet launched another 25 planes towards the reported Japanese position. As the last plane heaved itself off Hornet’s deck, the battle achieved a delicate balance.

Enterprise and Hornet steamed in two tight circles of ships: the Big E escorted by battleship South Dakota and cruisers Portland and San Juan, Hornet escorted by cruisers Pensacola, Northampton, San Diego and Juneau. The two carriers and the 169 planes they carried faced four Japanese carriers - the now-damaged Zuiho, as well as Shokaku, Zuikaku and Junyo - packing 212 aircraft, and accompanied by a potent surface force including four battleships and eight heavy cruisers. In the air, three American air strikes had set course for the Japanese carriers, while the Japanese had already launched one big strike, and were within minutes of launching a second.

Sixty miles from the Big E, planes from the opposing strikes began passing each other. The first few groups of planes flew on without incident; then nine Zeros dove out of the sun, slashing at the Enterprise’s plodding Avengers. Within moments, three Avengers were downed, and a fourth forced to return. The Avenger’s escorts, commanded by LCDR James Flatley, initially were unaware of their plight as the Wildcats had turned away, weaving back and forth to match their forward progress with the slower Avengers. Swinging back, Flatley and his airmen snapped into action at the sight of smoking TBFs falling away, fending off one attacking Zero, and sending three others into the sea. Well short of halfway to the Japanese carrier’s, Big E’s strike had been considerably weakened, but Hornet’s planes continued on at full strength.

USS Hornet CV-8 under attack at Santa Cruz, a Japanese dive bomber immediately overhead.

Minutes later, Enterprise’s radar operators belatedly identified the incoming strike, due to the confusion caused by the many groups of planes now northwest of the force. With the enemy planes only 45 miles from Task Force 61, the Combat Air Patrol - 38 Wildcats, controlled by Enterprise - had little time to react. The CAP was further hindered by the inexperienced air controller on Enterprise; positioned too low and too close to the Task Force, only a few of the fighters could grapple with the incoming dive bombers which began their attack at 0955.

Four Hornet planes made first contact, downing two Japanese bombers 20 miles from the force. Minutes later, Enterprise pilots LT Albert D. Pollock and ENS Steve G. Nona each downed a bomber. As other fighters struggled to gain altitude and advantage over the incoming strike, at 0957 Enterprise turned and headed for a rain squall, where she took shelter.

Despite the best efforts of the CAP, 22 Val dive-bombers and 18 Kates made it through, to focus their fury on Hornet. This was the first time Hornet had come under concerted attack, and her CO, Captain Charles P. Mason, sensed it would be bad. At 1008, Hornet’s loudspeakers blared “Stand by for dive-bombing attack”, and four minutes later it began.

The first two Val dive-bombers missed the big ship, but the third hit the aft starboard flight deck, before the squadron commander guided his damaged plane right into her, bouncing off the stack, crashing into the flight deck, detonating a 100-lb bomb (the other bomb the plane carried, 550-lbs, did not explode), and showering the signal bridge with burning gasoline.

From the rear, two Kate torpedo planes made good their drops: their fish blew a pair of 15’ x 30’ foot holes in Hornet’s hull on the starboard side, flooding the aft fireroom and forward engine room. Three more dive-bombers scored hits on the crippled ship’s flight deck, setting off more fires on her forward half; a second plane crashed into Hornet’s forward port gun gallery, the fuselage tumbling into the forward elevator pit. Within minutes, Hornet lost power and propulsion. Destroyers Morris and Russell pulled alongside her to help fight her fires, but it was clear she was out of action.

Ten miles to the northeast, Enterprise emerged from the rain squall which had hidden her from the attacking planes. Hornet - burning and adrift - was clearly visible from Enterprise:

At 1020 HORNET appeared to be hit. Fires observed on island structure. At 1024 our aircraft reported there were 17 planes in attack on HORNET — Enterprise Deck Log, 26 October 1942

With Hornet disabled, Enterprise was now the last American carrier left to fight in the Pacific.

Despite the tremendous damage she’d sustained, Hornet still had a last punch to throw. While she was under attack, her first strike had overflown a Japanese surface force - LCDR Gus Widhelm wanted to find the carriers - but her second strike chose to give the enemy cruisers special attention. Led by LT J. J. Lynch, at 1030 nine Hornet Dauntlesses dove on the heavy cruiser Chikuma and scored 2-4 direct hits with 1000 lb bombs (accounts vary), and several near misses: Chikuma survived the attack but barely. Bomb-carrying Avengers from the same strike later attacked the cruiser Tone, but could do no better than a near miss.

By this time, however, Widhelm had found Nagumo’s carriers. Shortly after flying over the force the second strike attacked, Widhelm’s Dauntlesses were jumped by Zeros. A running dogfight ensued, with the Wildcat fighter escort joining in. Twenty minutes later, three Dauntlesses were downed (including Widhelm’s, who survived), along with several Zeros, and the remaining bombers found themselves over the carrier Shokaku and the damaged Zuiho. Ignoring the damaged carrier, the 11 SBDs dove on Shokaku - Admiral Nagumo’s flagship - and staggered her with at least three 1000 lb. bombs (the Japanese reported four hits, and other observers reported as many as six). Shokaku was saved by the fact that her planes were gone and her fuel lines empty. Her flight and hangar decks were destroyed, however, and she would be out of action for nine months. Hornet’s “big guns” had nearly evened the score.

Enterprise’s strike, weakened by its encounter with the enemy Zeros, had mixed results. As the fighter planes were low on fuel from the earlier scrape, the strike attacked the first enemy ships they encountered. This turned out to be a force centered on the battleships Hiei and Kirishima. Dauntless pilots LT(jg) Henry Ervin, ENS John Richey and LT(jg) George Estes reported two hits on Kirishima, but Japanese documents later noted only near misses. Simultaneously, the five Avengers attacked a cruiser, but none of their torpedoes scored hits. What Enterprise lacked in offensive punch today, however, she would make up for in her own defense.

At 1030, ten minutes after emerging from her protective rain squall, Enterprise turned into the wind to recover Scouting Ten, and both her and Hornet’s Combat Air Patrol. A second strike, to be led by LCDR James Thomas, was being prepared for launch. This strike never took off, as at about 1100, enemy planes appeared on radar, dangerously near and closing fast. For long minutes, the Big E struggled in her attempts to fend off the attack. As was the case during the attack on Hornet, the fighters on CAP were badly positioned to intercept, and given nonsensical bearings by the inexperienced controller who reported the incoming enemy position relative to the carrier (“Bogey ahead 20 miles”). As the enemy bombers grew near, technicians struggled to find them using new 5”-guns’ fire control radar, until at last - at 1115 - an Enterprise lookout reported the Vals directly overhead.

A 1000 yards off Enterprise’s starboard quarter, the 45,000 ton South Dakota held her position at 27 knots, and stayed there as the Big E maneuvered radically to evade the bombers. Encircling the two ships, two cruisers and eight destroyers trained their guns on the two dozen Vals overhead, and waited for the command to fire. In moments, it came. One Fighting Ten pilot, flying over the cruiser San Juan, was startled to see the ship apparently explode stem to stern: in fact she had opened fire with every gun she could bring to bear. On Enterprise and South Dakota, the new 40mm Bofors anti-aircraft guns dropped enemy planes before they could release their bombs.

On fire from previous hits, Enterprise heels over as she turns violently to evade attacking planes.

Half of the attacking planes never escaped the American guns and fighters, but the remainder pressed home the attack. Bombs raised geysers around Enterprise, before first bomb plunged through the forward flight deck at 1117 and reemerged to explode in the air, just off the ship’s bow. Shrapnel peppered Enterprise with 160 holes between the waterline and forecastle; the blast set one Dauntless on fire, and knocked another overboard, taking with it Sam Presley AMM 1/c, who was manning the 30mm guns in the plane’s rear seat.

Seconds later, a second bomb struck just aft of the forward elevator, and broke in two. One half exploded on the hangar deck, destroying seven planes. The other half detonated two decks below, wiping out a repair party and a medical party, killing forty men, and setting bedding on fire.

Two minutes after the first bomb hit, as survivors struggled out of the shattered compartments and damage control parties went into action, a third bomb exploded very near to starboard, rocking the entire ship, caving in hull plating by three inches, and breaching two empty fuel tanks. The jarring blast knocked a second Dauntless overboard; another plane shimmied over the side of the flight deck and tumbled into the gun galleries. Despite her wounds and starboard list, Enterprise maintained speed and position, her gunners pounding away, until the order to stop firing came at 1120.

For 15 minutes, the men of Task Force 16 caught their breath, as the CAP chased away the last of the bombers. Over 20 bombs had been targeted for Enterprise; only two hits and a near miss had caused damage. From Enterprise’s bridge, seven enemy planes had been observed to crash “in the immediate vicinity”; a total of fifteen enemy planes downed in this attack alone.

At 1135 - just after a false periscope report - a second attack came in. This time it was fifteen Kate torpedo planes commanded by LCDR Shigeharu Murata. Enterprise’s CAP, in particular the fighter section led by LT Stanley “Swede” Vejtasa, pounced. Vejtasa knocked down two Vals speeding away after their diving attacks on the Big E, and then climbed to 13,000 feet, vectored towards the incoming Kates. Ten miles from the task force, Vejtasa and and his wingman LT Dave Harris spotted the Kates low over the ocean, racing towards their targets at 250 knots. Plummeting on the Kates from above, the two men downed six planes before running out of ammunition; other fighters accounted for another three planes. In total, Vejtasa could claim seven planes shot down on this single day.

One damaged torpedo plane headed for the destroyer Smith and plowed into her forecastle, killing 28 and wounding 23. Smith’s officers adeptly guided the destroyer through the speeding task force and buried her burning bow in South Dakota’s wake; minutes later her gunners were adding to the force’s anti-aircraft flack.

At 1144, the remaining torpedo planes lined up on Enterprise, preparing for a classic “anvil” attack. The Kates to starboard dropped first; Enterprise’s Captain Osborne Hardison ordered full right rudder and neatly combed the torpedoes - one by just ten yards - before ordering full left to avoid the burning Smith and a second spread of torpedoes. Moving at 28 knots, the carrier’s stern shuddered violently with each radical turn, finally coming into line with five more Kates, forcing them into a long turn to get into launching position. Three of the five were shot down before launch by the force’s anti-aircraft barrage. Another made a desperate attempt to launch from a stall off Enterprise’s stern: both torpedo and plane fell harmlessly into the sea. Only one of the five made a good drop; Hardison calmly conned Enterprise to parallel the fish, and it passed by without incident.

At 1159, the Big E finally steadied her course, and prepared to begin landing the Hornet and Enterprise planes collecting overhead. After a momentary disruption caused by South Dakota gunners mistakenly opening fire on six friendly Dauntlesses, Landing Signal Officer LT Robin Lindsey began guiding planes in. Only a few planes had landed, however, when the Task Force guns roared back to life. A third attack had begun.

The third strike was a flight of 18 Val dive bombers escorted by 12 Zeros, commanded by LT Maseo Yamaguchi from the carrier Junyo. On an earlier pass, Yamaguchi had not seen Enterprise - most likely she was hidden in a squall - and had radioed his intent to attack a cruiser instead. By now, however, radio traffic had alerted the Japanese to the presence of second American carrier, and Junyo ordered Yamaguchi to find it and attack. This second carrier was Enterprise, and Yamaguchi led his men in on a glide-bombing attack at about 1220.

”… then there was one …”: Planes circle to land on Enterprise, the last operating American carrier in the Pacific.

The persuasive power of South Dakota’s and the Big E’s 40mm Bofors AA guns seemed to gaining notoriety: they brought down four Vals - including Yamaguchi’s - early in the attack, and a number of the remaining planes dropped their bombs as much as 500 yards distant the Big E’s flight deck. Still several planes pressed on, one scoring a very near miss on the starboard side, again whipping the whole carrier along her length and opening several empty compartments to the sea. Another hit South Dakota’s Number One turret, killing one man and wounding 50, including Captain Thomas Gatch, whose seamanship had held the massive battleship 1000 yards off Enterprise’s starboard quarter, even as the nimble carrier veered wildly at as much as 28 knots. A third bomb pierced the anti-aircraft cruiser San Juan from deck to bottom, but failed to explode.

It is nearly impossible now to reconcile the various accounts of the number of planes downed in this engagement. Enterprise’s Fighting Ten claimed 17 enemy planes, at a cost of seven Wildcats and four pilots. Hornet’s VF-72 claimed 28 planes, against a loss of ten Wildcats and five pilots. South Dakota’s gunners are generally credited with downing 26 planes; Enterprise - planes and gunners combined - is credited with 63. The Japanese logs hint at the magnitude of their losses: only nine Zeros returned from the second Japanese strike in serviceable condition, only two of the 27 planes to attack Hornet returned, period.

The debate about exactly how many planes South Dakota and Enterprise shot down continues to this day. There is a mutual respect, however, between Enterprise’s men and those of South Dakota and North Carolina (which defended Big E at the Battle of the Eastern Solomons). Perhaps author Steve Ewing has best identified the bottom line:

Regardless of who is correct - and we’ll never know for obvious reasons - Enterprise gunners shot down more planes at Eastern Solomons in 15 minutes and at Santa Cruz in 25 minutes than did the vast majority of all battleships, carriers, cruisers and destroyers throughout the entire war. — USS Enterprise (CV-6): The Most Decorated Ship of World War II

At 1235, after fending off a unsuccessful fourth attack by 15 Vals, Enterprise again turned into the wind to take on planes. By this time, the sky was crowded with fighters critically short of fuel and ammunition, Enterprise’s scout and attack sections, and planes from Hornet seeking the only operating flight deck available. (And that barely: one near miss had jammed Enterprise’s #1 elevator in the up position, and the #2 elevator was stuck in down position.) LSO Robin Lindsey brought in the CAP first, followed by the Dauntlesses and TBFs circling the ship. As the planes landed, they were hurriedly pushed past the #2 elevator to make room for the many planes behind them. Despite being ordered to stop, Lindsey continued to bring planes in, and eventually 95 planes were packed aboard Enterprise, the last dozen or so having to catch the first or second arresting wire to stop short of the planes jamming the deck.

In this condition, Enterprise was exceedingly vulnerable to further air attack, so an hour after landings started, Admiral Kinkaid ordered the task force south and out of the battle area. In the meantime, Hornet’s men were working furiously to save her.

With the assistance of destroyers Morris and Russell, Hornet’s fires had been brought under control, and the cruiser Northampton had moved in close to take her in tow. The first attempt - made while the Big E was fending off Yamaguchi’s Vals - failed when Northampton’s tow line parted. A second try with Hornet’s heavier tow line succeeded however, and by the middle of the afternoon Northampton was easing Hornet to safety at 3-4 knots. With heroic effort, Hornet’s men raised steam pressure in three boilers, and by 1600 were prepared to restart the ship’s generator.

Twenty minutes later, however, a small 15-plane strike launched from Junyo attacked. Northampton hurriedly dropped her tow line; with no CAP for defense, the small force’s gunners were all that could protect Hornet. Northampton handily dodged several torpedoes, but one caught Hornet on the starboard side, flooding the engine room and increasing her list to 14 degrees. A small bomber attack twenty minutes later did no damage, but as Hornet’s list increased to 18 degrees, it was clear she was doomed. Captain Mason ordered “abandon ship”, and over the next several hours the destroyers and cruisers were kept busy picking up the men - most of whom were in remarkably high spirits - and fending off the small attacks which continued through the afternoon, scoring two more hits on the battered ship. Perhaps what was most notable about these late afternoon strikes was their small size. For the final strike, the carrier Zuikaku could launch only four Vals.

Officers and men gather on Enterprise’s hangar deck, as the 44 men killed at Santa Cruz are buried at sea, 27 October 1942.

Informed of Hornet’s condition, from Noumea Admiral Halsey ordered her sunk, to keep her out of enemy hands. Destroyers Mustin and Anderson first fired 16 torpedoes at her, with only three hits, and then pummeled her with over 400 5” shells, setting her afire along her entire length. Alerted to the Japanese surface forces fast approaching, Hornet’s escorts abandoned her and fled south. When the Japanese found her at about 2230, they tried and failed to take the burning hulk in tow, finally sinking her with four Long Lance torpedoes.

Though the Japanese initially hoped to pursue the remaining American forces, a night PBY torpedo attack on the October 27th, and their own devastating plane losses, convinced them otherwise, and early in the afternoon of October 27 they were ordered back to Truk.

At the cost of Hornet, the destroyer Porter (torpedoed during the first attack on Enterprise), 74 planes, and over 400 men killed or wounded, the American fleet had turned back a superior Japanese force and severely weakened Japan’s remaining carrier air forces.

The Consequences

Though tactically Santa Cruz was a draw, strategically it was a narrow victory for the Americans. Nagumo’s carriers and Kondo’s battleships had been turned away from Guadalcanal, giving the Marines and soldiers there some much needed relief. Perhaps more importantly, the destruction of the best Japanese naval aircrews, begun in earnest at Midway, culminated at Santa Cruz. Though plane losses were high on both sides - 74 American and 92 Japanese - the loss of airmen pointed to a Japanese catastrophe. Nearly 70 Japanese aircrews - including a number of squadron leaders - never returned to their carriers at Santa Cruz, while all but 33 American airmen did.

The first hint of the damage done to Japan’s naval airpower was seen the day of the battle, in the feeble afternoon strikes at Hornet. A more telling sign came on November 11, when Enterprise - after quick patching by Sea Bees and the repair ship Vulcan - sortied from Noumea, a full air group on her flight deck, ready to fight. The only Japanese carriers in the area - Hiyo and Junyo, both slow converted ocean liners - were well north of Guadalcanal, carefully staying clear of the American planes there. Without planes and the crews to fly them, the enemy’s fleet carriers were impotent. Although Enterprise and her task force faced significant threat from ground-based air forces and submarines, the simple fact was this: 15 days after Santa Cruz, an American carrier stood off the Solomons, battered but ready for action, and not a single enemy carrier came forth to challenge her.